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Abstract. Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do call for either credits or
exemptions when calculating a multinational’s domestic taxes. This contradicts recent models with a
single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient.  I incorporate the fact that many nations
import and export capital.  With symmetric countries, credits by both is the only treaty equilibrium,
resulting in Pareto optimal effective tax rates which weakly dominate the non-treaty equilibrium rates. 
With asymmetric countries, the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization.  With
harmonization, it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries’
welfares only if neither uses deductions. 
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1 Additional evidence is reported by Hines (1988) and Wilson (1993).
2 Hines and Hubbard (1990), Altshuler and Newlon (1991), and Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph
(1995) all highlight the role of taxes in U.S. multinational repatriation decisions.
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1. Introduction
There is no question that foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinationals is a significant and
growing portion of many economies.  For example, consider the data summarized in Table 1 (OECD,
1998).  In 1985, the United States had $230 billion in FDI abroad and was the location for almost $185
billion of FDI from other countries.  By 1995, the U.S. was the source of $711 billion in outbound FDI
and was the host for $560 billion of inbound FDI.  This pattern holds for almost all countries, where both
inbound and outbound FDI as a percentage of GDP increased over the decade 1986-1996.  As a host of
evidence suggests, both the location and level of multinational investment are sensitive to taxes.  For
example, Hines (1996) reports that foreign investment shares in a U.S. state would drop 7-9% in response
to a 1% increase in the state’s tax rate.1  Given this sensitivity, governments can use their tax policies to
influence multinational investment.  This manipulation by governments can lead to inefficiencies in FDI
due to after-tax differences in relative rates of return.  One type of distortion particular to multinational
investment is the potential for the double taxation of foreign-earned profits.  When profits are generated
overseas, they are taxable by the local government immediately.  Upon repatriation by the parent firm,
these profits are again taxable by the parent’s home country.2  Many governments offer their
multinationals some form of relief from this double taxation.  This relief can be categorized into three
forms: credits, deductions, and exemptions, which are described below.  While these relief methods can
reduce tax distortions, typically they do not yield fully efficient levels of FDI.   
To counter this problem, the OECD proposed a model tax treaty which was most recently updated
in 1997 (OECD, 1997).  Although the bulk of the model treaty is given over to standardizing tax base
3 Hines (1994) discusses the importance of tax base definitions on U.S. multinational investment,
an aspect not considered in this paper.  Janeba (1996) considers the impact of differences in tax base
definitions on a model of tax competition with an imperfectly competitive output market.
4 Articles 10 and 11 of the OECD treaty (1997) do however place limits on dividend and interest
withholding taxes respectively.  The UN model treaty (1980) limits only dividend withholding taxes.
5 Tax treaties may have goals other than efficient capital allocation. For example, Gravelle (1988)
considers the role of tax treaties in eliminating tax avoidance, while the International Fiscal Association
(1992) discusses tax treaties and revenue generation for developing countries. 
6For an excellent discussion of the workings of the OECD model tax treaty, see Baker (1994).
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definitions, the restrictions placed on actual taxation are relatively simple.3   In particular, Article 23 of
the treaty restricts countries to use either credits or exemptions when calculating taxes on foreign-earned
profits.  No limits on statutory tax rates are imposed, nor is any tax rate coordination required.4  Thus, the
treaty simply rules out the use of deductions.  The United Nations (1980) model tax treaty makes a similar
recommendation.  Although the treaty provides no explicit justification for this rule, its stated objective is
to “remove the obstacles that double taxation presents” (OECD, 1997, pg. I-1).5  Tax treaties following
the OECD model are being used more and more often.  Treaties imposed by the U.S. quite closely follow
the OECD guidelines and, as Table 2 reports, the number of these treaties doubled between 1975 and 
1998.  According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis (1998), the amount of foreign direct investment
(FDI) covered by these treaties in 1998 was approximately $774 billion of U.S. investment abroad
(outbound FDI) and $586 billion of foreign investment within the U.S. (inbound FDI).  These amounts
represented 78% of total U.S. outbound FDI and 96% of the total U.S. inbound FDI.  Therefore, the aim
of this paper is to analyze the equilibrium performance of the OECD model tax treaty in a general
equilibrium model of tax competition.  This analysis shows that the OECD model treaty can have a
significant role in improving global capital flows.6  Inherent in this study is an examination of the
7 Earlier static models include Hamada (1966) and Musgrave (1969).  Hamada suggests that for
given statutory tax rates, credits are superior to deductions as they lower the effective tax rate and
promote more efficient capital allocation.  Exemptions offer a similar improvement.  Musgrave points out
that although Hamada is correct concerning world income, credits and exemptions yield a lower home
income since they encourage excessive FDI from home’s point of view.
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equilibrium performance of the various double taxation rules.
As stated above, the three basic methods of double taxation relief are deductions, credits, and
exemptions.  Under the deduction method, the home government treats host taxes as a cost.  Thus, after-
host-tax profits are taxed by the home government at the home statutory tax rate.  Under credits, the home
government offers a limited credit for host taxes paid when calculating the home tax bill.  This credit is
limited in the sense that the home government does not rebate excess credits to the firm.  Thus, if the host
tax bill is larger than the pre-credit home tax liability, the firm is in an “excess credit” position and no
further taxes are paid on the repatriated profits. Alternatively, if the home tax bill exceeds host taxes paid,
the multinational is in an “excess limit” position, and the difference between the home and host tax bill
must be paid upon repatriation.  Finally, the home country may choose to exempt overseas profits.  Under
this method, no taxes are paid to the home government on foreign-earned profits.  Together home and
host statutory tax rates combined with home’s double taxation method define an effective tax rate on
overseas profits.  Changes in any of these components will change the effective tax rate and thus the
relative after-tax return on overseas investment.  This alters multinational investment patterns.  
Although tax competition has been closely examined by several researchers, their results do not
provide a sound rationale for the model treaty’s recommendations.  Early work by Bond and Samuelson
(1989) compares the equilibria arising under credits and deductions in a tax-setting game between a single
capital exporter and a single capital importer.7  A key feature of their setup is that the capital exporter may
practice discriminatory taxation where foreign-earned profits are taxed differently than domestic profits. 
8 Article 24 of the OECD model treaty (1997) calls for non-discriminatory taxes.  Although many
countries pay lip-service to this rule, Hines (1988) and Hufbauer (1992) find evidence indicating that
many tax rates are discriminatory in practice.
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This results in more aggressive taxation under credits than under deductions.  In fact, under credits
equilibrium taxes are so large that they result in zero capital flows.  Since deductions permit positive
equilibrium capital flows, it follows that deductions are superior to credits from a home, host, and world
perspective.  In this context, the OECD model treaty would reduce world welfare.  Feldstein and Hartman
(1979) also allow for discriminatory taxation but solve for the Stackelberg equilibrium tax rates rather
than the Nash equilibrium tax rates.  As with Bond and Samuelson, they find that the capital exporter
would choose to use deductions.  If credits or exemptions were imposed, however, full efficiency would
still not be reached, since foreign taxes would remain positive.  Thus again the OECD model treaty would
fail to reach its goal. 
In contrast, Janeba (1995) finds that in equilibrium deductions and credits are welfare equivalent
given a single capital exporter and uniform (i.e. non-discriminatory) tax rates.8  He shows that the
equilibrium capital distributions under credits, deductions, and exemptions are identical, implying
government indifference over these methods.  In this setting, the OECD model treaty does nothing to
improve welfare.  Janeba does demonstrate that Pareto improving tax coordination can only be achieved
through credits or exemptions in the absence of side payments. However, tax rate coordination is not
called for in the OECD model treaty.  Gordon (1992) also uses uniform taxation but allows for an
endogenous capital supply.  In this setting, he finds an equilibrium in which the capital exporter
randomizes over its tax rate.  Despite this, capital flows will still be distorted without tax rate
coordination, even if credits are used.  This still leaves us with the question of why might the OECD
model treaty reach efficient capital flows?
One fact of FDI investment patterns not considered by the above work is that most countries are
9 Slemrod, Hansen, and Proctor (1997) find a similar result for a small country that not only earns
a constant rate of return on outbound capital but also pays a constant cost for inbound capital.  In
addition, they show that optimal taxation includes exempting inbound FDI from domestic taxation.  As
most countries do tax inbound FDI, this implies that their model does not fully capture the role of two-
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both home and host for FDI.  As Table 1 indicates, countries both import and export capital in significant
amounts.  The above work on tax competition, however, assumes that countries are either pure capital
exporters or importers or that governments are only concerned about net capital flows.  Since inbound
FDI can have different welfare impacts from outbound FDI, it seems necessary to explicitly consider
inbound and outbound capital flows separately.  If doing so alters incentives for taxation, it may also
influence the equilibrium performance of the double tax rules.  Furthermore, it is more intuitive to model
the OECD model treaty in the context of two way flows, since unless countries coordinate their taxes, a
single capital exporter can replicate the treaty through its unilateral choice of relief method.
Although there exist contributions to the tax competition literature which model two-way capital
flows, they miss key features necessary for the current discussion.  Yang (1996) examines the impact of
capital flight on tax competition.  In his analysis, however, it is again only the net capital flow position of
a country that drives its tax policy.  Additionally, by imposing symmetry Yang finds that equilibrium net
capital flows are zero, a result contradicted by the data.  Finally, Yang implicitly imposes exemptions and
does not consider how the use of either credits or deductions affects tax competition.  Mintz and Tulkens
(1996) also consider two-way capital flows, but include a constant external rate of return for outbound
capital flows.  This removes the general equilibrium properties that the OECD recognized in its global
efficiency objective.  Under this assumption, Mintz and Tulkens show that when a government is
unrestricted in choosing lump-sum taxes, an optimal tax policy sets the effective tax rate on outbound FDI
equal to the overseas tax rate.  In the terminology of Janeba and this paper, this indicates that deductions
are the optimal relief method.9  This use of deductions results from discriminatory taxes and the timing of
way capital flows.
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government decisions.  Despite the presence of two-way flows, as detailed in Section 3.3, under
discriminatory taxation the OECD model treaty still does not correct the tax distortions.
In contrast, I discuss the impact of credits, deductions, and exemptions on tax competition in the
context of uniform taxes and simultaneous two-way capital flows which earn endogenous rates of return. 
This leads to a number of new results.  First, I find that for any given combination of double taxation
relief methods, an equilibrium always exists with positive capital flows in both directions.  This result
differs from Bond and Samuelson because I do not have the monopsonistic motives that drive capital
exporter taxes in their setting.  This eliminates the ratcheting effect which drives taxes to prohibitive
levels under credits.  Unlike Janeba, I also find that both countries set positive tax rates in equilibrium
since they import capital as well as export it.  This behavior leads to differing equilibrium welfare
properties across the combinations of relief methods, which Janeba did not observe.  Although these
differences improve the performance of credits and exemptions, they do not necessarily imply their
equilibrium use.  When countries are symmetric in their endowments and technologies, all possible
subgame perfect equilibria without a tax treaty involve either deductions by at least one country or credits
by both.  Which combination of relief methods arises depends on the parameters chosen.  Under the
OECD treaty, symmetric countries will always reach a Pareto optimum which is weakly superior to the
unrestricted equilibrium.  This is true even in the absence of tax rate coordination and side payments. 
With asymmetric countries, both countries will not always enjoy an improvement under the treaty.  In
particular, the OECD treaty without tax coordination does not reach Pareto optimal relative effective tax
rates.  In some cases, the model treaty will even fail to offer Pareto improvements over the equilibrium
without a treaty.  However, similar to Janeba (1995), it is shown that when deductions are eliminated, tax
harmonization can always reach efficient capital flows without injuring either asymmetric country.  When
at least one country uses deductions, this is not the case.  
10 Since all major capital exporters offer some form of double taxation relief, I do not explicitly






governments’ best responses are comparable to when home uses exemptions.
11 I assume countries can credibly commit to the tax treaty.  Alternatively, since I derive the
subgame perfect equilibria, my results can be interpreted as bounds on what is self-enforcing by the
standard Folk theorems as they apply to a repeated game framework.
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 lays out the basic model under two
restrictive assumptions: symmetry between countries and FDI levels which are convex in tax rates.  Here,
I derive the equilibria both with and without the OECD model treaty.  Section 3 relaxes these two
assumptions and discusses their impact on the results.  Section 3 also extends the model to discriminatory
taxes and alternative timing structures.  Section 4 concludes. 
2. The Model
In this section, I derive the results from tax competition with and without the OECD’s model tax
treaty under two assumptions: symmetric countries and FDI levels which are convex in tax rates.  Under
these assumptions, which are explained below, the model treaty’s implications are most striking.  I relax
these assumptions in Section 3.
Consider a two country setting in which each government maximizes its national income through
its choice of tax policy.  A tax policy consists of both a method of double taxation relief and a tax rate,
which are chosen independently.  Specifically, governments simultaneously choose their method of
double taxation relief, and after observing these choices, simultaneously set tax rates.  Tax rates are
constrained to the interval [0,1].  After both tax policies are set, factor markets equilibrate.  In the absence
of a treaty either credits, deductions, or exemptions may be chosen in the first stage.10 Under the OECD
treaty, only credits or exemptions may be chosen.11  All factor and output markets are perfectly
12 Throughout this paper asterisks will be used to denote values for the foreign country.
13 Unlike Markusen (1984), I have only one exludable factor of production.  Including labor in
the current model would introduce the Ramaswami (1968) effects that drive taxation in models such as
Bond and Samuelson (1989) or Janeba (1995).  By excluding labor I can isolate the role of two-way
capital flows.
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competitive.  Equilibria are required to be subgame perfect.
Each country, home and foreign, is endowed with an inelastic supply of capital, K and  K*.12  Both
countries produce a good with constant market price.  For simplicity, this price is set to one.  Each
country produces both domestically and abroad.  Home uses its capital to produce in the home country
using the production function h(K-Z) and in the foreign country using a subsidiary with the production
function hs(Z).  Z is therefore the amount of home’s outbound FDI.  Z may also be interpreted as foreign’s
inbound FDI.  Analogously, foreign produces domestically using the production function f(K*-Z*) and
overseas using the production function f(Z*).  All production functions are strictly concave, at least twice
differentiable, and satisfy the Inada conditions.  
This production structure can result from a country-specific public factor of production as
suggested by Markusen (1984).  In such a setting, two-way capital flows would occur as country-specific
capital moves to take advantage of multi-plant economies of scale.  This would occur even if each plant
faces constant returns to scale in capital and the public factor of production, leading to the reduced form
production structure I use here.13  Alternatively, this production structure can emerge from a model
similar Markusen and Venables (1998).  In that setting, multinational production occurs in a differentiated
product industry.  Depending on parameter values, multinationals will produce in each country in
equilibrium.  Although Markusen and Venables specify constant returns to scale production, downward
sloping demand for the multinational’s overseas output yields decreasing marginal returns from overseas
production analogous to my specification. 
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For the moment, I assume that countries are symmetric, that is they have identical technologies
and endowments.  Note that this implies that fs(Z*) = hs(Z*) for all Z and that Z = Z* wherever  τ = τ*.  The
asymmetric case is dealt with in Section 3.2.
2.1. Production
Profit taxes are uniform regardless of whether profits are generated locally by domestic capital,
locally by inbound FDI, or overseas by outbound FDI, i.e. profit taxes are non-discriminatory.  In this
one-shot game, all profits are repatriated.  Investors maximize their profits from production by shifting
capital overseas until the after-tax marginal products of domestic and subsidiary production are equalized. 
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where τ and τ* are the relative effective tax rates on subsidiary production, which are themselves functions
of the statutory rates, t and t*, and the method of double taxation relief chosen.  Explicitly:
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Note that under credits, the relative effective tax is positive if, and only if, the overseas statutory tax rate
exceeds the domestic statutory tax rate.  Otherwise, the relative effective tax is zero.  Compare this to
exemptions, where the relative effective tax rate will be negative if the domestic tax rate exceeds the
overseas tax rate.  
14 As shown by Debreu (1952), this assumption guarantees that best response functions are
continuous on either side of the 45E line.
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From the equilibrium conditions (1) and (2), the response in FDI levels with respect to a change
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one.  Thus α and β represent changes in the domestic output when the relevant effective tax changes. 
2.2. Government Behavior
Each government chooses its tax rate and relief method to maximize its country’s national
income. This is done with the knowledge that tax policies influence capital flows. Home and foreign
national incomes are:
(7)Y ' h(K&Z) % (1&t ()h s(Z) % tf s(Z ()
and
. (8)Y ( ' f(K (&Z () % (1&t)f s(Z () % t (h s(Z)
Both of these objective functions are assumed strictly concave in the government’s own tax rate (in the
case of credits, this strict concavity is piecewise above and below the 45E line).14  Regardless of the
double taxation methods being used, equations (7) and (8) can be differentiated to yield (suppressing the
arguments of functions):
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Equations (9) and (10) imply that from a country’s perspective, outbound capital flows are optimal when
its relative effective tax rate is equal to the overseas statutory tax rate.  Deductions will obtain this optimal
level of outbound FDI regardless of the value of either statutory tax rate.  Credits yield optimal outbound
FDI only when either the overseas tax rate or the domestic tax rate is zero.  Under exemptions, outbound
FDI is optimal only when the domestic tax rate is zero.  Note that this refers to optimality from a
country’s perspective.  World income is maximized when both relative effective tax rates are zero.  This
is because taxes merely reallocate income between countries and can only distort investment decisions.  
Equations (9) and (10) contain two important and countervailing effects in tax revenue from
inbound FDI.  The first term in both equations is the tax-capturing effect.  This represents the increase in
the share of inbound FDI production captured through taxation.  The fourth term is the tax-shifting effect,
which represents the drop in inbound FDI as the effective tax rate rises.  These competing effects are
crucial in determining the optimal tax rates.  Let me define a tax-capturing regime for home as one in
which  is non-decreasing in t* for all values of t*.  One simple example satisfying thisf s & t
(1&τ()
β
condition is when domestic and overseas production functions are both logarithmic functions of
investment, i.e. and .  A sufficient condition for a tax-capturing regime isf ' A ln(K (&Z () f s ' A ln(Z ()
if β(τ) is non-decreasing in τ.  Conversely, home is in a tax-shifting regime if  is decreasingf s & t
(1&τ()
β
in t* for some values of t*.  A necessary condition for the tax-shifting case is that β is decreasing in τ* for
some range of effective taxes.  In turn, this requires that Z* be locally concave in τ* in this range.  Since Z*
is bounded above by K* and below by zero, under the Inada conditions, Z* asymptotically approaches
these bounds as τ* approaches -4 (which is only possible when foreign offers exemptions) or one.  This
15 A wealth of literature including Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines (1996), and Grubert and Mutti
(2000) estimate the effect of taxes on FDI, however, all of them use specifications that assume that FDI is
a concave function of the tax and do not consider convex functional forms.
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implies that β(τ) may most likely be decreasing for extreme effective tax rates.15  In the tax-capturing
regime, a rise in the foreign tax implies that, home can increase its tax revenues from inbound FDI by
raising its tax.  The tax-shifting regime, however, implies that, for at least some range of foreign taxes, in
order to maximize tax revenues from inbound FDI home would choose to lower its tax in response to a
rise in the foreign tax.  Thus, in a loose sense, an increase in the foreign tax increases the size of the tax-
capturing effect relative to the tax-shifting effect in the tax-capturing regime and lowers it in the tax-
shifting regime, leading to respective increases or decreases in the home tax.  Therefore, while the tax-
capturing and tax-shifting effects are always part of home’s tradeoffs, this regime terminology is intended




decreasing in t for all values of t, then foreign is in a tax-capturing regime, otherwise, foreign is in a tax-
shifting regime.  As with home, for foreign to be in the tax-shifting regime it is necessary that α be
decreasing in τ over some range of effective taxes.  Note that under symmetry, since these regimes are
defined across all values of the overseas tax, one country is in the tax-capturing regime if and only if the
other is as well.  For ease of exposition, in this section I assume that both countries are in the tax-
capturing regime.  I return to the tax-shifting regime in Section 3.1.
Subgame perfection requires that I first identify the equilibria of the second-stage subgames
defined by the countries choice of double tax rules.  This leads to my first proposition.
Proposition 1: Regardless of the relief  method chosen by either country, there exists a Nash equilibrium
in the tax rate setting subgame such that positive capital flows exist in both directions.
16 The notation H-F, refers to pair of relief methods used by home (H) and foreign (F) in any
particular subgame, where H,F 0 {c,d,e} which represent credits, deductions, and exemptions
respectively.  For example, C-D refers to the subgame where home uses credits and foreign uses
deductions.  This same notation in subscripts identifies the tax rates and best responses for each subgame.
17 In the tax-shifting regime, home’s best response will be negatively sloped for some portion. 
The implications of this alternative are discussed below.
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Proof: I begin by describing the home best response correspondence.  Table 3 presents home’s first-order
conditions across the nine subgames defined by the various combinations of double tax rules.16 
Depending on the combination of relief methods, home’s optimal tax is one which balances effects on
outbound FDI and tax revenues from inbound FDI.  As noted above, the first of these is the impact of the





share of the tax base (the first term) with changes in the level of that base (the second term).  This second
term is present unless the foreign firm is in an excess limit position, i.e. foreign offers credits and .  t t< *
When home uses deductions, its outbound FDI is invariant to its tax rate and it chooses a tax
which maximizes inbound tax revenues.  In the D-D subgame, home’s inbound FDI is independent of the
foreign tax, and home’s best response is a constant as in Figure 1.  The same is true for foreign.  For
convenience define the equilibrium home and foreign tax rates under D-D as and .  In the D-E$t $*t
subgame τ* decreases along tde(t*) because when t* rises home finds it optimal to choose a tax that yields a
larger tax base which it can tax.  In the tax-capturing regime, even though τ* is falling, a rise in the foreign
tax encourages home to increase its tax as illustrated in Figure 2.17  In the D-C subgame, as long as
home’s tradeoffs are the same as in D-E.  The difference between these cases is when . t t≥ * t t< *
Here, Z* is independent of home’s tax rate, permitting home to match foreign’s tax rate without affecting
the tax base.  Thus, home will always at least match foreign’s tax rate.  This is summarized in Figure 3.  
When home uses exemptions, in addition to the above effect on inbound FDI, it must consider
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how its tax rate influences its outbound FDI.  This second effect is represented by the term






home perspective.  This places a damper on home’s desire to tax, indicating that these home country best
responses lie below those for when home used deductions.  Note that as t* approaches one, so does τ,
implying that Z moves towards zero and the gap between home’s best response under exemptions and
under deductions disappears.  In the E-E subgame, even in the tax-capturing regime, the slopes of the best

















which due to the last term is ambiguous in sign even if α and β are increasing in τ.  Note that when t* = 1,
τ = 1, implying that home’s best response tee(t*) is upward sloping at t* = 1.  For simplicity in my
graphical analysis, I assume that both tee(t*) and  t*ee(t) are upward sloping everywhere.  This impacts none
of my results.  Finally, since production functions satisfy the Inada conditions, best responses cannot be
backwards bending.  The E-E case is shown in Figure 4.
When home offers credits, the effect of home’s tax depends on whether t is greater or less than t*. 
When , home’s investors are in an excess limit position, implying that Z does not respond to smallt t> *
changes in t.  Therefore home’s incentives mirror those when it offers deductions.  When , Zt t< *
responds to t and home’s incentives are the same as when it offers exemptions.  Although these piecewise
best responses follow either the deduction or exemption best response (the shape of which depends on
foreign’s relief method), this switch at can cause a jump in the home best response.  This occurst ' t (
because although a relatively high tax rate captures more revenue from inbound investment, it
simultaneously encourages excessive outbound investment.  Consider the C-D case.  For values of  t $ t*,
home’s local best response is .  However, as t* approaches , the benefit of optimallyt t tcd ( ) $
* = $*t
taxing inbound FDI is outweighed by the cost of excessive outbound FDI and home prefers a tax rate
lower than .  These two facts implies a jump in home’s best response at some .  For values$t t cd
*
of  home will set while for , home will choose the same tax it does under t t cd
* *< t t tcd ( ) $
* = t t cd
* *>
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E-D.  At , home is indifferent between and  and will randomize between them.  Thist t cd
* *= $t t ted cd( )
*
yields a mirror image of the foreign best response in Figure 3.  A similar effect arises under C-E, yielding




than , both of the C-E and C-D equilibria will be in pure strategies.  Also, note that the C-Dt̂ (
equilibrium is equivalent to the E-D equilibrium.  When both countries use credits, however, no jump
occurs.  Noting that  along the 45E line, home’s best response for and intersectα(0)' β(0) t > t ( t t< *
where the tax rates are equal.  Thus, although there may be a kink in , there is no jump in it.  Thist tcc ( )
*
C-C case is shown by Figure 6.  Again, since the production functions satisfy the Inada conditions, all  
C-C equilibria are such that .  t t t tcc cc( ) ( )
* *=
Note that in all subgames, home’s best response to  is always some t > 0 while its bestt * = 0
response to is something less than one.  Thus, the home best response crosses the 45E line.  Sincet * =1
a similar analysis describes foreign’s best responses, this indicates the existence of a Nash equilibrium
with both statutory tax rates less than one.  Furthermore, this means that both effective tax rates are less
than one, implying that there exists a Nash equilibrium pair of tax rates which results in positive capital
flows for all combinations of relief methods. Q.E.D.
It is important to contrast this result to the work utilizing one way capital flows.  Without the
domestic influence on the overseas capital market, I avoid the ratcheting effect that drives taxes to
prohibitive levels under credits in Bond and Samuelson (1989).  Additionally, under uniform taxation, an
increase in a country’s tax rate increases outbound FDI under credits or exemptions.  This places
downward pressure on tax rates and further reverses the Bond and Samuelson result.  The impact of
discriminatory tax rates on the current model is discussed in Section 3.3.  Janeba (1995) also finds
positive equilibrium FDI under credits and exemptions under uniform taxation.  In his one-way capital
flow setting, however, the equilibrium under each relief method is welfare equivalent.  In contrast, I find
that welfare levels generally differ across pairs of relief methods.  This is a result of two-way capital
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flows.  With two-way flows, each country faces the tradeoffs of both the capital importer and the capital
exporter.  Due to inbound FDI, capital exporters no longer find zero taxation to be a dominant strategy. 
Because statutory and effective taxes vary across combinations of relief methods, equilibrium welfare
properties will vary across subgames.
Before determining the subgame perfect choice of relief methods, it will prove useful to consider
the relative performance of the double taxation rules for a given overseas tax rate.  Regardless of the relief
method chosen by its opponent, for a given overseas tax rate a country will find deductions weakly
superior to credits.  Furthermore, a country will find credits weakly superior to exemptions for a given
overseas tax rate.  To recognize this, consider the home country.  Offering deductions sets τ = t*, yielding
home’s optimal level of Z regardless of the level of t*.  For t > 0, Z is too high under credits from home’s
point of view for any positive t*, while under exemptions, Z is too high for all t*.  This is Musgrave’s
(1969) argument.  In addition to superior outbound FDI under deductions, the fact that deductions make τ
unresponsive to t gives home more leeway in setting its tax rate to maximize its inbound FDI tax
revenues.  Credits are preferred to exemptions for a similar reason, since as long as t $ t*, Z is
unresponsive to t.  Therefore, for a given value of t*, home weakly prefers deductions to credits to
exemptions, regardless of the relief method chosen by foreign.  The size of the income difference across
relief methods depends on the responsiveness of home and foreign FDI to the effective tax rate.  The
same ranking among relief methods holds for foreign for a given t.  Note that this analysis is not
dependent upon either symmetry or a tax-capturing regime.  While this would seem to indicate that
deductions are always a best response, a government can influence equilibrium tax rates through its 
chosen relief method.  It is therefore necessary to consider the differences in the equilibrium tax rates
across subgames, leading to my second proposition.
Proposition 2: When countries are symmetric, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the tax-
capturing regime is one in which both countries use deductions and set their tax rate equal to . t̂
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Proof: I begin by describing home income along its best response for each of the combination of relief
methods.  First, suppose that foreign uses deductions.  In the D-D case,   At     dY(t(t
(),t ()
dt (
' &h s # 0.
t* = 0, tdd(0) = tcd(0) = t^ > ted(0).  In the absence of foreign taxation, home income is the same regardless
of whether it offers credits or deductions.  Home income is lower under exemptions because, since          
τ < 0 = t*, home’s outbound FDI is too large from home’s perspective.  This concern over excessively
high Z also leads home to set a tax rate less than its inbound FDI tax revenue maximizing choice,
implying that Ydd(t(0),0) = Ycd(t(0),0) > Yed(t(0),0).  When  t* = 1,  τ = 1, and Z = 0.  Home will then
choose the same tax rate regardless of its relief method, i.e. tdd(1) = tcd(1) =  ted(1) = .  This indicates thatt̂
Ydd(t(1),1) = Ycd(t(1),1) = Yed(t(1),1). These comparisons are summarized in Figure 7.  When home faces
credits, Y(t(t*),t*) appears as in Figure 8.  In this case, regardless of the relief method home chooses
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symmetry implies that tcc = t*cc,  , indicating that Ycc is at its minimum. 
dY(t(t (),t ()
dt (
' f s & h s ' 0
Figure 9 illustrates home income along its best response when facing exemptions.  Again, regardless of
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the E-E equilibrium for symmetric countries tee = t*ee, Yee is at its lowest in the E-E equilibrium.  These
results indicate that for given tax rates, home income is (weakly) highest when it offers deductions,
second-highest when it offers credits, and lowest when it offers exemptions.
I can now rule out both E-C and C-E as equilibria.  Since C-C and E-E are efficient while neither
E-C nor C-E are, this implies that at least one country’s welfare must rise by switching its relief method to
match the other country’s method.  Thus, at least one country would deviate from the E-C and C-E
combinations.  I can also rule out the E-E by noting that, since home income is at its lowest point when
responding to exemptions with exemptions, both credits and deductions are preferred to exemptions.  Of
these, deductions are the best response to exemptions.  Recalling that under symmetry income is constant
18
along the 45E line, for fixed tax rates a country’s income is highest when it offers deductions, and the




































As a result, C-C cannot be an equilibrium when deductions are available.  If home were to switch respond
to credits with exemptions, it can lower the expected value of t* (given by the expression E(t*)) to    
E(t*ec) = tec.  Since Yec(tec,E(t*ec)) = Ycc(tcc,t*cc) > E(Y(tec,t*ec)), this implies that home prefers deductions to
credits to exemptions when facing credits. 
Finally, recall that under the tax-capturing regime best response tax rates are non-decreasing.  As


















and home finds that deductions are preferable to either credits or exemptions when facing deductions. 
Thus, home finds that deductions are a dominant double taxation rule.  An analogous analysis
reveals the same for foreign.  As a result, deductions by both countries is the equilibrium combination of
relief methods, implying that equilibrium tax rates are tdd = t*dd = .  Q.E.D. t̂
When facing deductions, a higher tax rate by one’s opponent does not effect inbound FDI. 
Responding to deductions with deductions does two things.  First, it increases the effective tax rate on
outbound FDI, inducing optimal overseas investment and lowering the overseas tax rate.  Together, these
mean that less subsidiary production is lost through taxes to the other country.  Second, switching to
deductions removes the need to exercise restraint in taxing inbound FDI, since this no longer encourages
excessive outbound FDI.  This allows a country to maximize its tax revenues from inbound FDI.
Combining these effects yields deductions as the best response to deductions.  
In the C-C and E-E equilibrium, statutory tax rates are equal, implying that taxes are not
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influencing capital allocations and world income is maximized.  When facing credits, choosing credits
instead of exemptions increases both world income and the income of the previously exempting country. 
Furthermore, by switching to deductions, a country restricts its capital outflows since the switch to
deductions increases the effective tax rate on outbound FDI.  Combined with a decrease in the overseas
tax rate, this reduces losses from overseas taxation and outweighs decreases in inbound FDI.  Therefore, it
is always better to choose deductions, regardless of the relief method used overseas.
This result differs from Janeba (1995), who found that credits and exemptions are no more or less
likely to occur than deductions.  Here, this is not the case since home and foreign welfares differ across
the subgames due to two-way capital flows.  Since the welfare effects of inbound versus outbound flows
differ, it is not sufficient to consider only one-way or net capital flows.  After taking this difference into
account, I find that symmetric countries will always be more concerned with their outbound FDI than
their inbound FDI, leading to the use of deductions in the tax-capturing regime.  This result does mirror
those found by Bond and Samuelson (1989) and Mintz and Tulkens (1996), both of whom find that
deductions are an optimal policy for a capital exporter.  It is instructive to consider the differences behind
these similar results.  Bond and Samuelson find that a capital exporter would choose deductions over
credits or exemptions since the overseas tax rate is smaller under deductions than credits or exemptions. 
Since in their one-way capital flow model a capital exporter’s income is always decreasing in the overseas
tax rate, they find that deductions are the most preferred method of double taxation relief.  With two-way
flows, however, a country’s income can be increasing or decreasing in the overseas tax rate.  This occurs
because although an increase in the overseas tax decreases returns from outbound FDI, it can increase tax
revenues from inbound FDI.  With symmetric countries, however, the possible losses due to changes in
the overseas tax rate are always outweighed by improved taxation of inbound FDI and decreases in
outbound FDI.  Finally, as discussed in detail in Section 3.3, the Mintz and Tulkens result arises due to
discriminatory taxes and the timing of government decisions.
Also unlike Bond and Samuelson, I find that the use of deductions is welfare-reducing since both
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countries are worse of in D-D than either the C-C or E-E equilibria.  The availability of deductions is a
prisoner’s dilemma because the dominant relief method makes both countries worse off in equilibrium. 
Because of this, the OECD model treaty, which prohibits deductions, can improve on this outcome.
Corollary 1: When countries are symmetric, a tax treaty which proscribes the use of deductions always
yields Pareto optimal equilibrium relative effective tax rates.
Proof: From Proposition 2, recall that credits were preferred to exemptions when facing either credits or
exemptions.  Therefore C-C is the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under a treaty which rules out
the use of deductions.  In this equilibrium, tcc = t*cc, indicating that  τ = τ* = 0.  Since both relative
effective tax rates are zero, both home and foreign capital are efficiently allocated.  This is true for both
the tax-capturing and the tax-shifting regimes. Q.E.D.
With symmetric countries, the OECD treaty improves the world allocation of capital, as well as
the welfare of both countries, relative to the non-treaty equilibrium.  This indicates that both countries
would be willing to enter into such a treaty.  This seems rather remarkable as the treaty does not require
coordination of either tax rates or relief methods.  This result, however, crucially depends on two-way
capital flows.  If there were a single capital exporter, the capital exporter would set a zero tax rate in all
subgames since a positive tax rate will only lead to excessive capital flows.  Janeba’s (1995) result would
then arise, where credits and exemptions do not improve over deductions.  Since the relative effective tax
rate would be positive and equal in all subgames, capital flows would be inefficient with or without the
treaty.  With two-way flows, both countries choose positive tax rates.  Under symmetry they choose
identical tax rates, which results in socially efficient capital allocations under treaty. 
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3.  Extensions
The above results were determined under the assumptions of symmetry and tax-capturing.  It is
therefore necessary to test their sensitivity to those assumptions.
3.1. Symmetric, Tax-shifting Regime
In the tax-capturing regime, upward-sloping best responses when using deductions implied that it
was always possible to lower the other country’s tax rate by responding to deductions with deductions.  It
also implied that in the D-C and C-D subgames, the equilibrium tax rates would be in pure strategies.  In
the tax-shifting regime, these need not be true.  This introduces complications that expand the set of
possible equilibria without a treaty.
Corollary 2: When countries are symmetric and equilibrium taxes in the D-C subgame are in pure
strategies, all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the tax-shifting regime involve at least one country
using deductions.  Furthermore, this equilibrium is inefficient.
Proof: Using a proof identical to that for Proposition 2 shows, I can derive conditions identical to (12)
and (13).  These imply that a symmetric country will always find credits preferable to exemptions when
facing either credits or exemptions.  It will also find deductions preferable to credits when facing credits. 
Thus, all equilibria in double tax rules involve at least one country using deductions.  Since τ, τ*, or both
will be non-zero in any equilibrium involving the use of deductions, equilibrium capital flows will be
inefficient in at least one direction.  Q.E.D.
Two items differentiate this result from Proposition 2.  First, since best responses can be
downward sloping in the tax-shifting regime,  it will now no longer be true that t*dd is less than either t*ed
or t*cd.  Thus, the chain of inequalities in (14) can fail, indicating that deductions need no longer be a best
response to deductions.  Second, it requires that equilibrium tax rates in the D-C subgame are in pure
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strategies.  Note that if this is true for D-C, under symmetry it must be true for C-D.  If this condition
fails, then home will find itself optimizing against the expected value of t* rather than its actual value in
















home may prefer to use credits instead of deductions when facing credits.  Under symmetry, the same is
true for foreign, thus C-C cannot be ruled out as a possible equilibrium even without the treaty.  As such,
if this added condition fails, Corollary 2 must be modified such that all subgame perfect equilibria involve
either deductions by at least one country or credits by both.  Note that if C-C is an equilibrium, then it is
efficient since both effective tax rates would be zero.
Despite this ambiguity in the unrestricted game, the only equilibrium without the treaty is still the
efficient one described by Corollary 1.  Now, however, it need not be the case that both countries gain
under the treaty.  While this is trivially true if the equilibrium without the treaty is C-C, one country’s
income can fall under the treaty.  Suppose for example that the equilibrium double tax rules without the
treaty are D-E.  In this case imposition of the treaty may benefit foreign at the expense of the home
country.  Side payments would then be necessary for both countries to agree to the treaty in the tax-
shifting regime, despite a higher world income. 
3.2. Asymmetric countries
Without loss of generality, label the countries such that when both effective tax rates are zero,
fs(Z*) $ hs(Z*).  This means that foreign overseas production is no less than home overseas production  in
the absence of tax distortions.  When countries differ in either their technologies or their endowments,
even in the tax-capturing regime it is difficult to narrow the set of possible equilibria, with or without the
treaty.  In spite of this, the following result can still be established.
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Corollary 3: Exemptions by both countries cannot be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in double tax
rules.  Furthermore, in the tax-capturing regime, the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium involving
deductions is D-D.












increase in the overseas tax rate.  By switching to credits, home encourages foreign to tax more
aggressively as long as t > t*, since home FDI is now unresponsive to taxes.  This implies that in
equilibrium t*ce > t*ee, and that home finds credits preferable to exemptions when facing exemptions.  It
follows that E-E cannot be a subgame perfect combination of double tax rules, regardless of whether
deductions are permitted or not.  This is true for both the tax-shifting and tax-capturing regimes.  Note
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Similar to symmetric countries in the tax-capturing regime, deductions are always a best response
to deductions in the tax-capturing regime.  As in the symmetric case, MYdd(t(t*), t*)/Mt* = -hs < 0.
Combining the facts that home prefers deductions over either credits or exemptions for a given foreign tax
rate and that t*dd =  < min{t*cd, t*ed} reveals that home will respond to deductions with deductions.  Ant̂
(
analogous story holds for foreign. Q.E.D.
In light of this result, when deductions are prohibited three potential equilibria remain: C-C, C-E,
and E-C.  Unfortunately, regardless of which of these arises under the treaty, fully efficient capital flows
will not be reached.
Proposition 3: When countries are asymmetric, the OECD model tax treaty will not result in Pareto
optimal equilibrium effective tax rates.
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Proof: Given Corollary 3, three potential equilibrium pairs of relief methods remain under the treaty:    
C-C, C-E, and E-C.  One important distinction between the symmetric and asymmetric cases is the
equilibrium under C-C.  In the symmetric case, both best responses intersected the 45E line because at
that point , implying that  and that the country’s optimal tax rate was the sameτ τ= =* 0 α β( ) ( )0 0=
from above and below the 45E line.  In the asymmetric case, even if , it is not generally trueτ τ= =* 0
that .  This implies that one country’s best response will have a jump in it, similar to that inα β( ) ( )0 0=
the cases where only one country uses credits.  Which reaction function, if any, jumps depends on the
relative values of α and β in the absence of tax distortions.  On the 45E line, home’s local best response
from above is to set  , while from below home will set .  If ,f s*τ('0 '
t
1&t
β f s*τ('0 '
t
1&t
α α(0) > β(0)
this implies that  tcc(t*) will have a jump at tcc* as in Figure 10.  Starting from free factor flows, foreign
subsidiary output is more responsive to taxes than is home subsidiary output if .  Becauseα(0) > β(0)
foreign subsidiary output is relatively sensitive to changes in tax rates, a drop in the home tax rate greatly
increases inbound FDI which can then be taxed at a slightly lower tax rate.  Although inbound FDI tax
revenues fall by decreasing t, this decline is relatively slight.  At the same time, decreasing t improves
home’s outbound FDI since now τ > 0.  Therefore, home has an incentive to drop its tax rate below
foreign’s before tcc(t*)*t$t* = t*.  This same condition implies that  t*cc(t) is kinked as in Figure 10. 
Foreign’s kink occurs because the relatively unresponsive hs encourages higher foreign taxation.  If
, then t*cc(t) has a jump and tcc(t*) is kinked.  Thus, at most one country uses a mixed strategyα(0) < β(0)
in equilibrium.  This jump leads to my inability to rule out C-E or E-C as equilibria with or without the
treaty.  This jump also means that regardless of whether the equilibrium is in pure or mixed strategies, it
is such that statutory taxes are not equal even in C-C.  Recognizing that in each of these cases the
equilibrium in tax rates is such that t … t*, it follows that at least one relative effective tax rate differs from
zero.  This indicates that capital is inefficiently allocated even under the treaty, and that the equilibrium
relative effective tax rates are not Pareto optimal. Q.E.D.
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With asymmetric countries, it is still possible to find examples in which both countries gain under
the treaty.  However, even with the expanded set of possibilities there does not exist an equilibrium where
tax rates are equal.  This implies that at least one relative effective tax rate is non-zero and world income
is not maximized.  Therefore there exist Pareto superior tax rate combinations.  Furthermore, both
countries will not always prefer the equilibrium under the treaty to the D-D equilibrium, which is the only
equilibrium ruled out in the tax-capturing regime.  This occurs because even if equilibrium world income
rises under the treaty, there is no assurance that both countries will share in the gains.  Examples where
either home or foreign finds D-D preferable to the equilibrium under the treaty are readily calculated. 
Thus, without side payments, there is in general no reason to anticipate that both countries would be
willing to enter into a tax treaty since this eliminates the D-D equilibrium.  A similar result is found by
Kanbur and Keen (1993), who consider commodity tax competition between a small country and a large
trading partner. 
Of even greater concern is the potential for world income to fall under the treaty when compared
to the D-D equilibrium.  Such situations require the existence of equilibria involving mixed strategies in
tax rates.  Consider the situation illustrated in Figure 10, where home uses a mixed strategy in the C-C
equilibrium.  At point A, world income is higher under C-C than under D-D since at A, τ = 0 <  and    t̂ (
0 < τ* < .  At point B, foreign FDI is efficiently allocated since τ* = 0, however, home FDI is stillt̂
inefficiently allocated.  In fact, I am unable to rule out the possibility that at B, τ > , implying ant̂ (
increase in the tax distortion for home’s FDI.  If this additional distortion is large enough, world welfare
may be lower under C-C than under D-D.  Similar dangers arise under E-C and C-E.  Additionally, under
the E-C or C-E equilibria the effective tax rate on the exempting country’s outbound FDI can be negative
yielding a potentially greater distortion than the D-D equilibrium.  Combining this distortion with a
potentially higher effective tax for the crediting country raises the possibility that the treaty can reduce
world income, necessitating the fall in at least one country’s income. 
Thus, when countries differ, the OECD treaty does not reach fully efficient capital flows and may
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not ensure welfare improvements for both participants.  However, if I combine the guidelines of the treaty
with tax harmonization, both of these difficulties can be overcome.  
Proposition 4: A tax rate harmonizing treaty that rules out the use of deductions can always reach a
Pareto optimal pair of relative effective tax rates which increase the income of both asymmetric countries
without the need for side payments.  This is not true for a tax rate harmonizing treaty that permits the use
of deductions.
Proof: A Pareto optimum requires that both relative effective tax rates are zero.  This improves world
income over any possible equilibrium outcome in the unrestricted game since in the absence of tax rate
coordination, at least one effective tax rate will differ from zero.  Under any combination of credits and
exemptions, a necessary and sufficient condition for social efficiency is that t = t*.  In any combination
where at least one country uses deductions, social efficiency is reached if and only if both tax rates are
zero.  Since tax rates must be equal, Pareto optimal tax coordination is in fact tax harmonization.  Denote
this common tax rate th.  The values of home and foreign income under such a treaty will then be:
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When at least one country uses deductions, which implies that th is zero, values of both home and
foreign income are fixed.  Without side payments, it is impossible to guarantee that both Y(th,th) and
Y*(th,th) will be greater than their equilibrium values in the unrestricted game.  Examples can be calculated
where this is the case.
Under any combination of credits or deductions, by increasing th, home income is increased
(since fs*τ*=0 > hs*τ=0) and foreign income is decreased.  Since both effective tax rates remain constant at
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zero, shifting th maps out the entire Pareto frontier.  This make it possible to always choose tt such that
neither country is worse off under the treaty. Q.E.D.
This result stems from the workings of the various relief methods, and is similar to that found in
Janeba (1995).  In particular, under combinations of credits and/or exemptions both effective tax rates are
zero as long as tax rates are equal.  By adjusting the agreed upon tax rate, it is possible to move along the
Pareto frontier and find an agreed upon tax rate such that both countries will voluntarily enter into such a
treaty.  When one or more countries use deductions only one point on the Pareto frontier can be reached,
indicating a potential need for side-payments to ensure participation by both countries.  Furthermore, by
harmonizing taxes, full efficiency can be obtained.  This is true for both the tax-shifting regime and the
tax-capturing regime.  For symmetric countries, although the prohibition of deductions combined with tax
harmonization also implies Pareto optimal relative effective tax rates, it is not possible to map out the
entire Pareto frontier.  With symmetric countries hs = fs when τ = τ* = 0, eliminating the ability to shift
income between home and foreign by altering the harmonized tax rate.  In the tax-shifting regime, side
payments may still be necessary to ensure mutual acceptance of the treaty by both symmetric countries,
even with tax harmonization. It is instructive to contrast this result with Kanbur and Keen (1993), who
consider commodity tax competition between a large and a small country.  They find that the small
country is always made worse off by tax harmonization, however both countries gain by the imposition of
an appropriate minimum tax condition.  I, on the other hand, find that the small home country as well as
the large foreign country can gain by appropriate tax harmonization.  Also, although I find that the
imposition of an appropriate minimum tax rate can lead to efficient capital allocations, this reduces the
flexibility in taxes necessary to ensure improvement in the welfare of both countries, creating the same
participation difficulties noted above.  
Despite the promise of harmonization, it is not seen in practice.  While tax treaties typically do
harmonize withholding tax rates, they do not harmonize corporate income taxes, a major component of
18 This is the timing used by Mintz and Tulkens (1996).
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effective tax rates.  As a result, my findings are perhaps best understood as relating to changes in these
non-negotiated tax rates from the OECD model treaty.  This suggests tensions or institutional constraints
to treaty formation not modeled here.  I leave the nature and implications of these constraints for future
research.
3.3. Alternative Timing Structures and Discriminatory Taxation
Here, I consider two final variants of the above model.  First, if the timing of government
decisions is such that countries choose their relief method and tax rates at the same time, D-D is the only
equilibrium without the treaty.18  This is true for both symmetric and asymmetric countries as well as for
the tax-shifting and tax-capturing regimes.  This occurs because a country will no longer be able to affect
its opponent’s tax rate through the choice of its own relief method.  Therefore it is optimal to choose
deductions, which offer superior capital outflows and an increased ability to tax capital inflows.  This
indicates that equilibrium tax rates will be as they are in D-D.  Under the treaty, since credits do at least as
well as exemptions given the overseas tax rate, credits are a weakly dominant double tax rule. This leaves
C-C as the equilibrium under the treaty. This however does not alter the results of Proposition 3, implying
that asymmetric countries may still be reluctant to enter into a treaty lacking tax harmonization.
The second variant of the model alters the assumption of  non-discriminatory tax rates.  This can
be done in three ways, all of which yield the same result.  The first allows for a different tax rate based on
the location of production.  Thus, a country may set one tax rate for domestic and inbound FDI profits
and a potentially different tax rate for outbound FDI profits.  Alternatively, a country may set a tax rate
based on the nationality of capital ownership.  Here, a country would set one tax rate for domestically
owned capital, regardless of whether it is used at home or abroad, and a separate tax rate for inbound FDI. 
Finally, the sort of tax flexibility considered in Mintz and Tulkens (1996) may be considered, where a
country can set differing tax rates for all three types of production under its tax jurisdiction. In any case,
29
such a change would make the debate over credits, deductions, and exemptions irrelevant, since the
equilibrium in each case is identical, mirroring Janeba (1995).  This result obtains because a country will
use one tax rate to maximize tax revenues from inbound FDI while using the other tax rates to set the
effective tax on its outbound FDI equal to the overseas tax rate.  This is also the result found in Mintz and
Tulkens.  When both countries do this, the effective and statutory tax rates on inbound FDI are the same
as in the D-D case, regardless of the actual double taxation conventions chosen. When countries have this
richer tax rate strategy space, they are essentially setting their method of double taxation relief and tax
rate on inbound FDI at the same time.  Therefore, the D-D result is the only equilibrium for both the tax-
capturing and tax-shifting regimes.  Furthermore, the OECD treaty would not be able to improve on this
situation in the absence of tax rate coordination, for symmetric and asymmetric countries.  Since
prohibiting deductions will only lead countries to choose tax rates which keep the same effective tax rates
as D-D, the welfare of both countries will remain unchanged.  This may help to explain the OECD
stipulation that tax rates on multinational investment should be non-discriminatory as contained in Article
24 of the model tax treaty (OECD, 1997). 
4. Conclusion
In summary, I have found that the consideration of two-way capital flows offers new insights for
the performance of the OECD model tax treaty.  In particular, with symmetric countries, the treaty always
obtains efficient capital flows.  Additionally, the treaty always improves the welfare of both participants
over a situation in which they both use deductions.  When countries differ, it is impossible to guarantee
that the OECD model treaty will improve the welfare of both.  Of particular concern is the possibility that
tax distortions may increase under the treaty.  However, if countries can harmonize their tax rates while
ruling out deductions, not only can efficient capital flows be reached, but it is possible to do so without
injuring either participant.  This is not always the case if one or more countries use deductions. 
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Therefore, the inclusion of the fact that countries act as both home and host for multinational investment
provides useful insights for the theory of tax competition as well as for the development of international
tax treaties.
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Table 1: Inbound and Outbound Capital Positions





1995 1985 1995 1985
Austria 15.048 3.762 11.142 1.343
Canada 122.684 64.657 103.903 40.947
France 143.670 - 184.380 -
Germany 189.545 22.181 252.928 36.441
Japan 19.848 4.743 296.207 43.974
Korea - - 10.500 .484
Netherlands 122.399 24.952 177.766 47.772
United Kingdom 233.077 64.027 331.354 100.313
United States 560.086 184.616 711.621 230.287
Unavailable data is indicated by  -.
Source: OECD (1998)
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Table 2: List of U.S. Tax Treaties.
Aruba (1986-1996)1 India (1990-) Phillippines (1977-)
Australia (1953-) Indonesia (1989-) Poland (1976-)
Austria (1956-) Ireland (1952-) Portugal (1994-)
Barbados (1984-) Israel (1993-) Romania (1976-)
Belgium (1948-) Italy (1955-) Russia (1993-)
Canada (1941-) Jamaica (1981-) Trinidad and Tobago (1971-)
China (1985-) Japan (1954-) Slovakia (1994-)
Cyprus (1988-) Kazakstan (1993-) South Africa (1953-1987, 1997-)4
Czech Republic (1995-) Korea, Republic of (1977-) Spain (1991-)
Denmark (1948-) Luxembourg (1963-) Sweden (1940-)
Egypt (1981-) Malta (1981-1997)1 Switzerland (1951-)
Finland (1952-) Mexico (1993-) Tunisia (1986-)
France (1940-) Morocco (1978-) Turkey (1997-)
Germany (1954-)2 Netherlands (1949-) Ukraine (1994-)
Greece (1965-) Netherlands Antilles (1948-1987)1 United Kingdom (1945-)
Honduras (1956-1966)3 New Zealand (1948-) U.S.S.R. (1977-1992)5
Hungary (1980-) Norway (1951-)
Iceland (1976-) Pakistan (1958-)
1 Terminated by the U.S. due to partner's inability to prevent treaty shopping.  Treaty shopping is
the practice where investment from a third, non-treaty nation is funneled through a treaty partner in order
to obtain the preferential tax treatment.
2 Extended to cover the unified Germany in 1990.
3 Terminated by Honduras due to its opinion that all treaty benefits were accruing to the U.S. as a
result of the almost unilateral nature of capital flows.
4 Terminated in 1987 as part of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1987.  It was reinstated
in 1997.
5 Treaty provisions extended to former members until individual treaties can be negotiated.
Source: Diamond and Diamond (1998).
33


























































































































































































































Altshuler, Rosanne and T. Scott Newlon, “The Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on the Income Repatriation
Patterns of U.S. Multinational Corporations,” NBER Discussion Paper 571 (1991).
Altshuler, Rosanne, T. Scott Newlon, and William Randolph, “Do Repatriation Taxes Matter?  Evidence
from the Tax Returns of U.S. Multinationals,” in Martin Feldstein, James Hines, Jr. and R. Glenn
Hubbard, eds., Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995), 253-272.
Baker, Philip, Double Taxation Conventions and International Tax Law: A Manual on the OECD Model
Tax Convention on Income and on Capital of 1992, 2nd Edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994).
Bond, Eric and Larry Samuelson, "Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for International Taxation of
Capital," Economic Journal 99 (1989),1099-1111.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Detailed Annual Balance of Payments and Position Estimates
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Economic Analysis International Data, 1998). 
Debreu, Gerard (1952), “A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 38, pp. 886-893.
Diamond, Walter and Dorothy Diamond (1998), International Tax Treaties of All Nations, Ocean
Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York.
Feldstein, Martin and David Hartman, “The Optimal Taxation of Foreign Source Investment Income,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (1979), 613-629.
Gordon, Roger, "Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?" The Journal of Finance 67
(1992), 1159-80.
Gravelle, Pierre, “Tax treaties: Concepts, Objectives and Types,” International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation Bulletin 522 (1988).
Grubert, Harry and John Mutti, “Taxes, Tariffs, and Transfer Pricing in Multinational Corporate Decision
Making,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73:2 (1991), 285-93.
Grubert, Harry and John Mutti, “Do Taxes Influence where U.S. Corporations Invest?” National Tax
Journal, 53:4 (2000), 825-39. 
Hamada, Koichi, "Strategic Aspects of Taxation on Foreign Investment Income," Quarterly Journal of
Economics 80 (1966), 361-75.
Hines, James R. Jr., "Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment," in Lawrence Summers, ed., Tax
Policy and the Economy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 33-61.
Hines, James R. Jr.,“Credit and Deferral as International Investment Incentives,” Journal of Public
Economics 55 (1994), 323-347.
38
Hines, James R. Jr., “Altered States: Taxes and the Location of Foreign Direct Investment in America,”
American Economic Review 86 (1996), 1076-1094.
Hines, James R. Jr. and R. Glenn Hubbard,“Coming Home to America: Dividend Repatriations by U.S.
Multinationals,” in Assaf Razin and Joel Slemrod, eds., Taxation in the Global Economy (Chicago:
University Chicago Press, 1990), 161-200.
Hufbauer, Gary, U. S. Taxation of International Income: Blueprint for Reform (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for International Economics, 1992).
International Fiscal Association, Double Taxation Treaties Between Industrialized and Developing
Countries; OECD and UN Models, a Comparison (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1992).
Janeba, Eckhard, "Corporate Income Tax Competition, Double Taxation Treaties, and Foreign Direct
Investment," Journal of Public Economics 56 (1995), 311-325.
Janeba, Eckhard, “Foreign Direct Investment Under Oligopoly: Profit Shifting or Profit Capturing?”
Journal of Public Economics 60 (1996), 423-445.
Kanbur, Ravi and Michael Keen, “Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When
Countries Differ in Size,” American Economic Review 83 (1993), 877-892.
Markusen, James, “Multinationals, Multi-plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade,” Journal of
International Economics 16 (1983), 205-226.
Markusen, James and Anthony Venables, “Multinational Firms and the New Trade Theory,” Journal of
International Economics 46 (1998), 183-203.
Mintz, Jack and Henry Tulkens, “Optimality Properties of Alternative Systems of Taxation of Foreign
Capital Income,” Journal of Public Economics 60 (1996), 373-399.
Musgrave, Peggy, “United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: Issues and Arguments,” Ph.D.
Dissertation, Harvard Law School, 1969. 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Model Tax Convention on Income and on
Capital (Paris: OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 1997).
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Direct Investment Statistics
Yearbook, 1997, (Paris: OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 1998).
Ramaswami, V. K., "International Factor Movement and the National Advantage," Economica 35 (1968),
309-310.
Slemrod, Joel, Carl Hansen, and Roger Procter, “The Seesaw Principle in International Tax Policy,”
Journal of Public Economics 65 (1997), 163-176.
United Nations (1980), “U.N. Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing
Countries,” U.N. Document # ST/ESA/102.
39
Wilson, G. Peter, "The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions," in Alberto Giovannini, R.
Glenn Hubbard, and Joel Slemrod, eds., Studies in International Taxation (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993), 195-231.
Yang, Yong, "Tax Competition Under the Threat of Capital Flight," Economics Letters 53 (1996),323-
329.
